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BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
I. STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
A. Does the Plaintiff's claim for negligence present 
any genuine issue of fact? 
B. Do the undisputed facts establish the Plaintiff's 
own negligence as a matter of law? 
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C. If Plaintiff is negligent as a matter of law, is 
Plaintiff's negligence the sole proximate cause of his 
injuries as a matter of law? 
II. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On November 21, 1981, the Plaintiff, Dennis Cook, 
was employed as an assistant manager in the Sears Automotive 
Center in Ogden, Utah. The Defendant Christiansen Brothers, 
Inc. was the general contractor who constructed the automo-
tive center earlier in 1981, and the Defendants Montmorency 
Hayes and Talbot Architects were the architects who designed 
the building that Christiansen Brothers built. 
During the course of the day, Plaintiff went to a 
drinking fountain near the middle of the north wall in the 
automotive center. While he was getting a drink, one of the 
men in the shop said something to the Plaintiff and, when he 
turned around, he lost his footing and fell hitting the 
fountain which his neck and falling to the floor. (Plain-
tiff's Deposition, pp 5, 6 and 7.) Plaintiff suffered 
serious injuries. 
Plaintiff alleges that the Defendants were 
negligent in the design, construction and placement of the 
drinking fountain about 18 inches away from a 12 x 12 oil 
drain designed for the dumping of excess oil in the shop. 
Plaintiff alleges that oil from the drain caused his fall, 
in that the presence of the oil was due to the negligence 
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design and placement of the drinking fountain and oil drain 
next to each other in the shop. 
The Defendants' move for Summary Judgment on the 
basis that Plaintiff's own negligence were the proximate 
cause of his injuries as a matter of law. Plaintiff appeals 
from the order granting summary judgment. 
III. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Issues of proximate cause in a negligence case are 
factual issues and are inappropriately decided in a motion 
for summary judgment unless (1) there is absolutely no 
evidence of a causal connection between the defendant's 
negligence and plaintiff's injuries or (2) plaintiff's own 
negligence is superceding and is the sole proximate cause of 
plaintiff's injuries as a matter of law. 
When viewed in a light most favorable to the Plaintiff, 
the facts present disputed issues both as to Plaintiff's own 
negligence and as to the contribution and extent of the 
Defendants' negligence in causing Plaintiff's injuries. 
Because of these factual issues, the case should proceed to 
trial and the trial Court's Motion for Summary Judgment 
reversed. 
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IV. ARGUMENT 
POINT I: THE DETERMINATION OF "PROXIMATE CAUSE" IN A 
NEGLIGENCE ACTION IS NORMALLY A FACTUAL DETERMINA-
TION. 
The issue of proximate cause is ordinarily a 
factual matter to be reserved for the trier of fact. Waters 
v Querry, 626 P.2d 455 (Utah 1981); Jensen v Dolen, 12 Utah 
2d 404, 367 P.2d 191 (1962). 
Two exceptions have been recognized to the general 
rule that the issue of proximate cause may not be resolved 
by summary judgment: 
1) If no evidence exists as to the causal 
connection between the defendant's negligence and plain-
tiff's injuries, summary judgment may be granted. Mitchell 
v Pearson Enterprise, 697 P.2d 240 (Utah 1985). 
2) If plaintiff's own negligence is 
undisputed, and plaintiff's own actions are an independent 
and intervening cause, summary judgment may be granted. 
Cooke v Mortensen, 624 P.2d 675 (Utah 1981). 
The Mitchell and Cooke exceptions, as applied to 
the Plaintiff's case, are discussed below. 
In an appellate review of a summary judgment, the 
facts are viewed in the light most favorable to the losing 
party. Mitchell, supra. 
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POINT II: DISPUTED FACTS EXIST WHICH MIGHT SHOW A CAUSAL 
CONNECTION BETWEEN THE DEFENDANTS1 ALLEGED NEGLI-
GENCE AND PLAINTIFFfS INJURIES. 
The Defendants asserted the Mitchell case, supra, 
in support of their Motion for Summary Judgment, arguing 
that no evidence exists of a causal connection between the 
Defendants1 alleged negligent design and placement of the 
drinking fountain and Plaintiff's fall. 
In Mitchell, the Plaintiff's decedent was alleg-
edly killed as a proximate result of negligent hotel 
security in the Hilton Hotel in which he was a guest when he 
was shot and killed by an unknown assailant in his room. In 
a lengthy opinion affirming summary judgment in favor of the 
defendants, the Utah Supreme Court found "no direct evidence 
liking Mitchell's death with the alleged inadequate security 
measures" at the hotel, and "no direct evidence of any kind" 
to how Mitchell met his assailant, how the assailant got 
into Mitchell's room, and what prior relationship, if any, 
Mitchell and the assailant might have had. Mitchell, supra 
at page 246. Since no causal evidence existed, trial was 
unnecessary. 
Here, the nature and causes of Plaintiff's fall 
were before the court. The roles of the Defendants in the 
design and construction of the automotive center were not 
disputed. Neither was the Defendants' alleged negligence in 
placing the drinking fountain next to the oil drain disputed 
for purposes of the motion. Because the Defendants produced 
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no affidavits or testimony in support of their Motion for 
Summary Judgment, only the Plaintiff's affidavit (addendum 
Exhibit "A") and Plaintiff's published deposition were 
before the court. 
Therefore, these facts showing a causal connection 
between the Defendants alleged negligence and Plaintiff's 
injuries were before the Court: 
1) The drinking fountain designed and 
installed by Defendants was being used for its intended 
purpose by the Plaintiff when he was injured while getting a 
drink. (Plaintiff's Deposition, p.7) 
2) The large hole next to the drinking 
fountain was designed for the purpose of disposing of waste 
oil from the shop. (Plaintiff's Deposition, p. 21) 
3) In the ordinary course of disposing of 
waste oil in the hole, employees would sometimes miss the 
hole and spill waste oil onto the floor in the vicinity of 
the drinking fountain and oil drain. (Plaintiff's Deposi-
tion, at 21) 
4) At the time Plaintiff was injured, a 
circle of oil approximately 18 inches in circumference lay 
on the floor around the oil drain and by the fountain. 
(Plaintiff's Deposition at 50). 
5) Plaintiff slipped in this oil while 
turning the respond to another employee while Plaintiff was 
getting a drink. (Plaintiff's Deposition at 7, 31 and 32). 
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6) Plaintiff will testify that his fall was 
caused by the oil surrounding the drinking fountain. 
7) Plaintiff will testify that the injury 
would not have happened but for the fact that the drinking 
fountain and the oil drain were placed next to each other in 
the design and construction of the building. (Affidavit of 
Plaintiff Dennis R. Cook, paragraph 3). 
8) Plaintiff will testify that improper 
placement of the drinking fountain next to the oil drain was 
the principal cause of his injury. (Affidavit of Plaintiff 
Dennis R. Cook, see also Deposition of Plaintiff at 22). 
The foregoing facts establish a simple causal 
connection between the placement and installation of the 
drinking fountain next to the oil drain by the Defendants 
and Plaintiff's fall. Although many other facts will be 
required by the trier of fact to determine whether, under 
all of the circumstances then existing, the Plaintiff's 
injuries were proximately caused by the Defendants1 negli-
gence, this simple causal connection is enough to deny 
summary judgment under the rational outlined in Mitchell/ 
supra. 
POINT III: THE ISSUE OF THE PLAINTIFFfS OWN NEGLIGENCE IS 
STILL IN QUESTION. 
The Defendants relied in the Trial Court on the 
Cooke case, supra, in support of their contention that this 
plaintiff was negligent as a matter of law. 
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In Cooke, the plaintiff was tenant in the defen-
dant's apartment* Plaintiff had asked the defendants to 
open an out-of-reach window in the apartment which had been 
painted shut during recent remodeling, and the defendants 
allegedly agreed to do so. When the defendants failed to 
unstick the window, the plaintiff constructed a platform of 
two two-by-four boards placed atop an overturned garbage 
can. When plaintiff climbed barefooted to the top of the 
platform and began hammering on the window, he lost his 
footing, fell through the can and tipped over injuring 
himself. The injured tenant sued the owners for their 
negligence in failing to unstick the windows. Upon the 
defendant's motion for summary judgment the court concluded 
that "the plaintiff's injuries were not a forseeable result 
of defendants actions "and that the plaintiff's own negli-
gence in constructing and climbing upon the unstable 
platform was the sole proximate cause of plaintiff's fall. 
The summary judgment was sustained on appeal, with the court 
noting that construction of the platform was an independent 
and intervening cause for plaintiff's fall. Cooke, supra at 
page 676. 
The Defendants assert the following undisputed 
facts in support of their contention that the Plaintiff 
acted negligently as a matter of law: 
1) Plaintiff was the assistant manager of 
the Sears Automotive Center (Deposition of Plaintiff, p 3). 
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2) The lighting in the auto center was 
"pretty good" at the time of Plaintiff's fall. (Plaintiff's 
Deposition, p 6). 
3) Oil was usually on the floor in other 
places around the automotive center. (Plaintiff's Deposi-
tion, p 16). 
4) Plaintiff had some oil already on the 
soles of his shoes. (Plaintiff's Deposition, p 7). 
While these facts may tend to show some negligence 
on the part of the Plaintiff himself, they are not conclu-
sive and certainly do not support a finding that the 
Plaintiff was negligent as a matter of law for purposes of 
the Motion for Summary Judgment. Much more needs to be 
known about the cause and foreseeability of Plaintiff's 
injuries. For example, the following questions need to be 
addressed by the trier of fact at trial: 
1) As assistant manager of the automotive 
center, did Plaintiff have a duty to clean up the oil around 
the drinking fountain? Defendants allege that he did have 
such a duty. The truth of his duties is disputed and 
evidence of those duties was not before the court. 
2) Was the oil found elsewhere in the 
automotive shop of a different nature than the oil found 
around the drinking fountain? No evidence of this was 
before the court. 
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3) Had the Plaintiff or other employees 
fallen because of oil on the floor in other areas of the 
shop? This issue has not been addressed. 
4) Did the oil around the drinking fountain 
differ in quantity from oil found elsewhere in the shop? 
This issue has not been addressed. 
5) Did the normal and expected uses of the 
drinking fountain present a greater risk of falling in the 
oil surrounding it than would be found elsewhere in the 
automotive shop? This issue has not been addressed. 
6) If the normal and intended uses of the 
drinking fountain presented any special hazard or risk of a 
fall, did the Plaintiff know or should he have known of this 
special risk or hazard? This issue has not been addressed. 
7) Was there more or less oil around the 
drinking fountain on the day of Plaintiff's fall than at 
other times? This issue has not been addressed. 
8) Did Plaintiff wear special shoes or take 
other special precautions to reasonably prevent his slipping 
in oil on the floor of the automotive shop? This issue has 
not been addressed. 
9) Did Plaintiff otherwise exercise 
ordinary and reasonable care which would be expected of an 
employee in the automotive shop while getting his drink? 
This issue has not been addressed. 
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These and other issues must be decided by the 
trier of fact after examination of all relevant facts at 
trial before Plaintiff can be found negligent as a matter of 
law. 
POINT IV. EVEN IF PLAINTIFF WAS NEGLIGENT AS A MATTER OF 
LAW, IT CANNOT BE SAID AS A MATTER OF LAW THAT 
PLAINTIFF'S NEGLIGENCE WAS AN INDEPENDENT AND 
INTERVENING CAUSE SUFFICIENT TO RELIEVE THE 
DEFENDANTS OF LIABILITY AS A MATTER OF LAW. 
Even if the Plaintiff can be found negligent as a 
matter of law, the Defendants may not be relieved of 
liability as a matter of law unless the Plaintiff's negli-
gence was an independent and intervening cause of his own 
injuries. Cooke, supra. 
If the Plaintiff was negligent, his negligence 
would be the sole legal cause, the superceding cause, only 
if his negligence was independent of Defendant's negligence. 
His negligence was not independent if it was foreseeable by 
the Defendants who designed and constructed the drinking 
fountain and oil drain. See Godeski v Provo City Corp., 690 
P.2d 541 (Utah 1984). The Defendants can assert no facts 
which might show that the Plaintiff's was using the drinking 
fountain in any manner other than its intended, foreseeable 
and expected manner. It was being used as it was designed 
to be used. Plaintiff's use of the drinking fountain could 
not be a superceding and independent cause because it was 
entirely foreseeable. Plaintiff has nothing in common with 
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the plaintiff in Cooke, supra, who constructed a platform on 
top of an overturned garbage can and fell off. 
If the Plaintiff was negligent as a matter of law, 
such negligence might also be superceding and relieve the 
Defendants of liability if, in the exercise of reasonable 
care, he should have seen the oil on the floor, he should 
have perceived it as potentially dangerous situation, and 
should have avoided it. Anderson v. Parson Read-e-Mix 
Paving Co., 24 Utah 2nd 128, 467 P2d 45 (1970). After all 
of the circumstances surrounding his fall have been examined 
by the trier of fact, this rule might be used to bar 
recovery from the Defendants. For purposes of Summary 
Judgment, however, the court had insufficient evidence of 
the standard of care which should have been used the 
Plaintiff, the Plaintiff's reasonable perceptions of the 
hazards, the Plaintiff's attempts to avoid the hazard, and 
the Plaintiff's general exercise of reasonable care to 
decide the issue of proximate cause as a matter of law. 
Some of these issues which remain unresolved are discussed 
in Point II above as preventing Summary Judgment even on the 
issue of Plaintiff's negligence. 
A proper determination of the "proximate cause" of 
Plaintiff's injuries will require a complete examination of 
all of the factors contributing to Plaintiff's fall, 
Plaintiff's own duties and actions, and a decision as to 
which of all the factors contributing to Plaintiff's fall 
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should be the legal cause. This case should proceed to 
trial for those determinations. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The Summary Judgment entered by the Trial Court was 
inappropriate because of unresolved factual issues concern-
ing the proximate cause of Plaintiff's injuries, and should 
be reversed. 
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Summary Judgment 
JACK C. HELGESEN 
HELGESEN & WATERFALL, P.C. 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
2650 Washington Blvd., Suite 102 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Telephone: (801) 621-1420 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
DENNIS R. COOK, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
CHRISTIANSEN BROTHERS, INC. a 
Utah Corporation; MONTMORENCY 
HAYES and TALBOT ARCHITECTS, 
INC., a Utah Corporation; 
MH and T ARCHITECTS, INC. a 
Utah Corporation; HALVERSON 
PLUMBING and HEATING, 
Defendants. 
AFFIDAVIT OF 
PLAINTIFF 
DENNIS R. COOK 
Civil No. 94076 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF WEBER ) 
I, Dennis R. Cook, hereby state under oath that: 
1. I am the Plaintiff in this action. 
2. On November 21, 1981, I was injured by a fall 
while using a drinking fountain at Sears Automative center in 
Ogden, Utah. 
3. The injury would not have happened but for the 
fact that the drinking fountain and oil drain were placed so 
close to each other that an accident was inevitable. 
4. I believe the poor placement of the drinking 
fountain next to the oil drain was the principal cause for my 
injury. 
rV< 
DATED this / ? day of August, 1986. 
.y^tM^co 
DENNIS R. COOK, Plaintiff 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this \°\ day of 
August, 1986. 
'--iiw./|„ (J ^.UJMS 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
Residing at: Ogden, Utah 
My Commission Expires: 3/3/87 
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RAYMOND M. BERRY 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Attorneys for Defendant Christiansen 
10 Exchange Place, 11th Floor 
P.O. Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Telephone: 521-9000 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
DENNIS R. COOK, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
CHRISTIANSEN BROTHERS, INC., 
a Utah corporation; MONTMOR-• 
ENCY, HAYES & TALBOT ARCHI-
TECTS , INC., a Utah corpora-
tion; MHT ARCHITECTS, INC., 
a Utah corporation; HALVERSON 
PLUMBING AND HEATING, INC., 
Defendants. 
MONTMORENCY, HAYES & TALBOT 
ARCHITECTS, INC., a Utah 
corporation, 
Third Party Plaintiff, 
vs. 
VAN BOERUM & FRANK ASSOCIATES, 
INC., a Utah corporation, 
Third Party Defendant. 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 94,076 
The motions of Defendants Christiansen Brothers, Inc.; 
Montmorency, Hayes & Talbot Architects, Inc.; MHT Architects, 
Inc. and Third Party Defendant Van Boerum & Frank Associates, Inc, 
for summary judgment that plaintiff take nothing came on for 
hearing before the above-entitled Court on Wednesday, August 
20, 1986, Honorable David Roth, District Judge, presiding; Jack 
C. Helgesen appearing for plaintiff, Raymond M. Berry appearing 
for Christiansen Brothers, Inc., Richard K. Hincks appearing for 
Montmorency, Hayes & Talbot Architects, Inc. and MHT Architects, 
Inc., Paul S. Felt appearing for Halverson Plumbing and Heating, 
Craig R. Mariger appearing for Van Boerum & Frank Associates; 
the deposition of Dennis R. Cook having been published, the 
memoranda of counsel having been read, the arguments of counsel 
having been heard and the Court being fully advised in the 
premises, and it appearing that there is no genuine issue of fact, 
NOW, THEREFORE: 
1. Judgment is entered in favor of each of the defendants 
that plaintiff take nothing; 
2. The Third Party Complaint of Montmorency, Hayes & Talbot 
Architects, Inc. is dismissed with prejudice; 
3. The Crossclaims of all of the parties against each other 
are dismissed with prejudice. 
DATED this day of August, 1986. 
BY THE COURT: 
DAVID ROTH, District Judge 
